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When good art is bad: 
Educating the critical viewer
Laura D’Olimpio
University of Birmingham, UK
Abstract
There is a debate within philosophy of literature as to whether narrative artworks should 
be judged morally, for their ethical value, meaning and impact. On one side you have the 
aesthetes, defenders of aestheticism, who deny the ethical value of an artwork can be taken 
into consideration when judging the work’s overall aesthetic value. Richard Posner backs artists 
such as Oscar Wilde who famously wrote, ‘there is no such thing as a moral or an immoral 
book. Books are well written, or badly written. That is all’. On the other side of the debate are 
proponents of ethical criticism such as Martha Nussbaum, Wayne Booth, Noël Carroll and Mary 
Devereaux. This article examines the educational implications of each position and ultimately 
defends the importance of moral education alongside aesthetic education. Given artworks are 
powerful vehicles for moral sentiments and meaning, it is important that viewers are taught to 
engage critically with art’s ethical features as well as aesthetic features. In this way, educational 
concerns pose a challenge to the position of aestheticism.
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Introduction
Among the debates that have raged within the field of philosophical aesthetics is whether 
or not the ethical value of an artwork may be taken into consideration when judging the 
overall aesthetic value of that artwork. The choice of position taken effects what one can 
say about the ethical value of an artwork, how it is to be evaluated and, further, its impli-
cations for society (for instance, in terms of censorship). The two main aesthetic posi-
tions that oppose each other are those of the aestheticist (also known as autonomism) and 
the moralist between which lies a graduated scale that allows for great or less compro-
mise. These include the positions of moderate autonomism, moderate moralism and ethi-
cism.1 To simplify the positions, the ethicist (moderate moralism and ethicism) answers 
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yes, there is a moral value of artworks that affects its overall aesthetic value, while the 
aesthete (the autonomist) states no. For the aesthete, even if there is a moral value of an 
artwork, this will not (or should not) affect the work of art’s overall value as the overall 
value of a work of art should be based solely upon its aesthetic value.2 Richard Posner 
(1997, 1998) backs artists such as WH Auden, George Orwell and Oscar Wilde who 
famously wrote, ‘there is no such thing as a moral or an immoral book. Books are well 
written, or badly written. That is all’. Against the aesthetes, on the other side of the 
debate, are proponents of ethical criticism such as Martha Nussbaum (1990, 1998), 
Wayne C Booth (1988, 1998), Noël Carroll (1996, 1998) and Mary Devereaux (1998, 
2004). While much has been written about the ethical criticism of narrative artworks, not 
enough attention has been paid to the educational implications of this debate.
While the appeal of aestheticism is to protect the creative expression of artists and 
their works, this poses an educational challenge for teachers who wish their students to 
be critically engaged viewers. In so far as an artwork contains a moral and/or political 
message, the viewer of the work ought to critically engage with it. Furthermore, some-
times engaging with the ethical messages of a work of art is unavoidable. For instance, if 
there is a beautiful artwork to which I have a strong – either positive or negative – moral 
response, as a viewer, I would find this very difficult to set aside and just appreciate the 
beauty of the work in question. There are many examples of precisely this – particularly 
when the aesthetic value and the moral value of the artwork is in tension. Well known 
examples include Mark Twain’s (1885) Huckleberry Finn and Vladimir Nabokov’s 
(1955) Lolita. In this article, I shall critically detail the positions of aestheticism and ethi-
cism and consider the educational implications of each. I ultimately defend the view that 
the value ascribed to a work may be a (positive or negative) moral value, and this moral 
value may affect the overall aesthetic value of the work of art. This need not result in 
censorship but should allow for critical engagement with art. Given artworks are power-
ful vehicles for moral sentiments and meaning, it is important that viewers are taught to 
engage critically with art in terms of both aesthetics and ethics.
Aestheticism
Autonomism, also known as ‘aestheticism’, states that art and ethics are autonomous 
realms of value. Autonomists argue that the only relevant evaluation of an artwork is that 
of the aesthetic as it is only an artistic focus that is relevant qua work of art. Radical 
autonomism, such as the position held by Clive Bell (1914) from the Bloomsbury Group, 
states that it does not even make sense to assess a work of art in terms of morality (or 
politics or cognition; Young, 2005: 70). Aesthetes such as Bell claim that an artwork 
should be evaluated only in terms of its formal aspects; namely the aesthetic qualities 
which may include form, expression, unity, composition, line, colour, shape, tone, tex-
ture and pattern. Unfortunately, agreement is lacking regarding those features that are 
considered to be both necessary and sufficient in supporting an evaluation of the artwork 
and its ensuing aesthetic experience. The aesthete defines aesthetic experience as, ‘the 
experience prescribed by an artwork that is valued for its own sake (and not for the sake 
of anything else, including moral enlightenment or moral improvement)’ (Carroll, 2000: 
353). In this way, the position of the radical autonomist has evolved as a 
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theoretical argument, whereby the very definition of aesthetic evaluation is based on 
what is categorically or conceptually unique to all artworks. This excludes moral evalu-
ation which may not pertain to every work of art. The position known as moderate auton-
omism allows for a moral assessment to be made of an artwork yet argues that the work’s 
moral value does not affect the aesthetic value. It is the artwork’s aesthetic value which 
is equivalent to the overall value of the artwork.
Autonomists try to protect ‘high art’ from censor and from being reduced to everyday 
values such as commercialism. They hold that the ethical realm, much like the economic 
or political realm, has nothing to do with that of the aesthetic. In fact, we can think of 
examples of moralising in artworks that reduce the artistic value or appreciation of the 
work due to the heavy handed moral message seeking to grab the spectator’s attention 
where the artwork may feel like a vehicle for the values presented. For instance, Aesop’s 
fables are one such example, whose purpose was primarily moral education. For aes-
thetes, it is the aesthetic experience that should be primary, not secondary, when encoun-
tering an artwork, and experience of the aesthetic good is conceptually distinct from 
moral goodness.
Furthermore, aestheticists claim that the aesthetic experience, defined in terms of dis-
interested attention and independent of ethics, is the common denominator applicable to 
all art and should therefore be the standard of judgement for all artworks. In defence of 
this ‘common-denominator’ argument, the autonomist explains that the formal features 
of a work of art when appropriately (aesthetically) engaged with, produce an aesthetic 
experience. It is the formal aspects of a work of art which account for the aesthetic value 
and thus the overall value of a work of art (Carroll, 2000: 352). Thus, for an art object to 
be valued as art it must be capable of eliciting from the viewer an aesthetic experience.
Educational implications of aestheticism
The ethicist/aestheticist debate is relevant in terms of its influence upon the critical eval-
uation of artworks that affects our recognition and evaluation of the impact of art. It is 
also educationally important because arts educators are teaching students how to engage 
with artworks; how to value them and how to receive them. If we consider that the aes-
thete is primarily and often exclusively concerned with the aesthetic features of, experi-
ence of and value of artworks, we can see that for art educators this justifies a protected 
space in which students can engage with art in a liberal manner. Aestheticism protects the 
place for art in society, and for artists’ free, creative expression. It is anti-censorship and 
given that censorship of art often hinges on the moral and political messages of artworks 
and the role such art may play in influencing citizens (particularly young people), aes-
theticism protects art and creative expression from such moral and political judgements. 
In this same way, aestheticism also separates art from its (wider) educational impact 
because it is concerned with art for its own sake and not for the sake of its impact (edu-
cational or otherwise).
Aestheticist Posner (1997) declares that ‘immersion in literature does not make us 
better citizens or better people’ (p. 2). Yet, there is a growing interest in research in char-
acter education as to whether good literature and poetry can indeed make us better people 
(Bohlin, 2005; Booth, 1988; Carr, 2005; Carr and Harrison, 2015). It is understandable 
140 Theory and Research in Education 18(2)
why art lovers wish to defend the value of art for its own sake. And yet, artists and art-
works play a significant role in encouraging reflection upon human activity. The place of 
art and the role for artists in society can be contentious precisely due to the moral, social 
and political impact of art; a fact of which aesthetes are well aware. Certainly Posner 
(1997) does not deny it, concluding his article by stating, ‘the formal properties do not 
exhaust the worth and appeal of literature, but the moral properties, I suggest, are almost 
sheer distraction’ (p. 24). This suggests that arts educators are better off focussing on the 
aesthetic qualities of a work of art rather than the ethical features on the aestheticist 
position.
One educational role for art includes highlighting society’s ethical, social and political 
actions. Thus it seems odd, and counter-intuitive, to insist we cannot speak about art in 
ethical terms particularly when art is sometimes used to promote or critique certain 
moral, political and social messages. Against the aestheticist, where artworks prescribe 
an audience response that invokes morality and ethics, surely the moral value of the work 
in question is a component of the overall aesthetic experience. Such a claim is most obvi-
ous in examples of narrative artworks such as novels, plays and films. For example, 
famous aesthete Oscar Wilde (1891) is known for arguing, in the preface of The Picture 
of Dorian Gray that there is no such thing as a good or bad book, rather, books are well 
or badly written and that is all. Yet, Wilde’s books contain moral messages that are almost 
impossible for the reader to ignore and he took the line of the aesthete in order to publish 
such sentiments and avoid censorship or rebuke (unsuccessfully in his case). When 
Wilde defended aestheticism, he was doing so precisely because he knew he would be 
accused of impacting upon people through his art (Freedman, 1993: 51–52). Wilde’s own 
interest in the debate was not in reference to the aesthetic/moral issue at hand, but rather 
the impact that people were trying to say his art had, and the impact he wished it to have. 
It is widely acknowledged that his art did impact and furthermore, continues to have a 
lasting moral impact.
We learn from narrative artworks. And Wilde’s texts are completely concerned with 
the ethical in such a way that sees the values of art and morality as both present in the one 
text. It is the moral message of Dorian Gray that largely contributed to making it a great 
work; it is the moral value of the work that enhances its overall aesthetic value. This may 
be because, in this instance, the moral message is an intrinsic part of the work, a formal 
feature of the narrative artwork, and in this way, will necessarily count towards its over-
all value. Allowing for the ethical evaluation of artworks need not result in censorship of 
artists and their work. However, where we find a moral message in an artwork, and given 
that art affects us emotionally as well as cognitively, artworks must be subject to ethical 
evaluation as well as aesthetic evaluation. As Booth (1998) argues against Posner,
As every reader of Wilde knows, whenever we fully engage with any story, we engage not with 
abstract concepts or moral codes but with persons, both with the characters in the story and the 
implied person who has chosen to portray them in this precise way. (p. 375, italics in the 
original)
And, as educators, we want to teach students to engage both critically as well as compas-
sionately and creatively with the artworks they encounter; with fictional characters and 
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scenarios, with the overall messages and meanings gleaned from texts as well as with 
their authors (D’Olimpio, 2018). If this is true, then we cannot rely upon aestheticism, 
we must instead move to a position that allows for ethical criticism of artworks.
Ethicism
Two positions that accommodate the fact that artworks are created in, and impact upon 
the world ethically are moderate moralism as advocated by Noël Carroll (1996, 1998, 
2000) and Berys Gaut’s (1998) ethicism. Moderate moralism holds that some works are 
concerned with morality and in such cases moral evaluation is relevant and may impact 
upon the work’s overall aesthetic value. However, works that are not concerned with 
morality, and lack ethical content and implications, are not appropriate objects of ethical 
criticism. Carroll (2000) notes that
even if there were a single criterion of value for all art, that would not have to preclude the 
possibility that there are not also multiple, local criteria of evaluation for certain genres of art, 
consistent with whatever the global criterion turns out to be. (p. 358)
For example, an artwork that has a moral message has a relevant ethical value that 
may or may not impact upon the aesthetic value of the work. The aesthetic value, 
therefore, is not determined by this ethical value alone – it can also, or even predomi-
nantly be determined by aesthetic features of the work. Ethicism is similar to the 
position of the moderate moralist, yet the ethicist takes a slightly stronger line when 
arguing for the ethical impact of an artwork upon the overall value of that work. 
Ethicism claims that ethical value is always relevant to aesthetic value if it is included 
in an artwork.
The autonomist claims that in society, it is only artworks that are primarily intended 
to promote aesthetic experience and thus they should be evaluated solely in terms of that 
to which they uniquely aim. Yet, artworks that combine aesthetic experience with social, 
moral and/or political messages are by no means uncommon. Examples range from the 
earliest religious art to any number of popular songs by artists concerned with social, 
political, environmental and economic issues that impact ethically upon society. The 
position of aestheticism does not do justice to these kinds of artworks, whose aesthetic 
experience includes understanding the relevant ethical messages imbued in the work. As 
Devereaux (2004) points out, Posner takes the ethical messages in works of literature to 
be optional extras, to which one may choose to attend to or not and, ‘Like most aestheti-
cists, Posner recommends the latter’ (p. 8). Yet, as Devereaux (2004) argues, ‘some kinds 
of moral judgements . . . take the literary work itself as their object’ (p. 8). This means 
that the ethical judgement, in order to be appropriately made, requires aesthetic sensibil-
ity. Narrative artworks can be subtle and complex. In order to judge them accurately, one 
needs to attend to them properly, aesthetically, in order to glean an appropriate reading 
of the work as well as the prescribed aesthetic experience. However, as will be discussed 
in further detail in the next section, it is also the case that some aesthetic features of the 
artwork require appropriate ethical responses in order to respond properly to the artwork 
qua artwork.
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The position of the ethicist, who defends either moderate moralism or ethicism, is 
more plausible as a theory of how we evaluate artworks and how we should evaluate the 
aesthetic experience and overall aesthetic value of art. This is because the moral message 
of an artwork may impact upon (support or negate, interrupt or augment) the aesthetic 
experience one has when engaging with an artwork that contains ethical components. 
Importantly, it is these components that are being evaluated as an aspect of the artwork 
in question and therefore, it is also these components educators want their students to 
learn how to engage with, in both an open, receptive manner as well as a critically 
engaged manner. I will give an example of why I think this is important and persuasive, 
by considering when the ethical flaw is also, one and the same time, a formal flaw in the 
artwork.
Moral flaws as aesthetic flaws
As mentioned earlier, the (moderate) autonomist may compromise slightly and allow for 
an ethical reading of an artwork that contains an ethical component, provided the ethical 
value does not in any way affect the aesthetic value, and vice versa. This is a position that 
maintains that the ethical and aesthetical spheres of value are autonomous. However, 
ethical critics may argue that an ethical blemish in an artwork affects the artwork as a 
whole and thus impacts upon its aesthetic value as well. Taking ethicism as our working 
example, when we take an ‘all-things-considered’ view of the work qua artwork, certain 
ethical failings in an artwork are always going to be aesthetic defects and, in this way, 
formal flaws in the work (Carroll, 2000: 375). Thus, as aesthetic defects, these ethical 
defects may affect the overall value of the art object. The classic example ethical critics 
often cite is Leni Riefenstahl’s (1935) Triumph of the Will, an infamous propaganda film 
covering a Nazi party rally held in Nuremberg, Germany. Beautifully shot with stunning 
cinematography, the aesthetic value of the film is undermined by its portrayal of Hitler 
as a moral political leader who simply wanted the best for all Germans. It is a piece of 
propaganda disguised as a documentary and the moral message of the film interrupts the 
aesthetic appreciation of the artwork (Devereaux, 1998). The ethicist claims that, in this 
example, it can be seen how the ethical defect of the work (negatively) affects its overall 
aesthetic evaluation. Ethicism also allows for the ethical message of a work to positively 
affect its overall aesthetic evaluation.
Arguing that moral flaws can be defects in an artwork, the ethicist offers the ‘merited 
response argument’ where prescribed responses to artworks are either merited or unmer-
ited by the narrative. If an artwork portrays an immoral message while prescribing aes-
thetic engagement, the immoral message may be unmerited and constitute an aesthetic 
defect in the work qua artwork if it interferes with the aesthetic engagement and pre-
scribed uptake of the work in question (Carroll, 2000: 375). For instance, there may be 
an unsympathetic character to whom the reader is invited to adopt a non-satirical, sin-
cerely sympathetic attitude towards. Yet, if the reader simply cannot do so due to the 
manner in which the character has been portrayed, then this is a flaw in the novel, not in 
the reader response. (Note that this is not to say we cannot sympathise with immoral 
characters or antiheroes – texts may be subtle and contain layers of meaning. Plus the 
overall ethical reading of the work may differ from the ethical judgement we make of a 
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character). In this way, immoral responses to artworks, ‘notably prescribing immoral 
cognitive-affective responses’ the ethicist argues, may be unmerited. This is particularly 
so if they give the audience reason to refrain from responding in the way that the artwork 
dictates (Carroll, 2000: 375). Thus, contrary to moderate autonomism and autonomism, 
moral defects in a work of art may be aesthetic flaws in the work. Uptake (or lack thereof) 
results from an audience member’s (in)ability to engage appropriately with the artwork 
in question and thus supports the ethicist’s position that moral defects in a work of art 
may impact upon its overall (aesthetic) value.
The reason this matters in an educational sense is because of how we teach young 
people to engage with artworks. We may consider that, in arts education, we are aiming 
to educate students to be appropriately sensitive audience members; well positioned to 
make the most appropriate (charitable as well as suitably critical) readings of works of 
art. If we were to adopt the position of aestheticism, we would only focus on teaching 
students to appreciate and critique the skill with which the words/paint/images are used, 
the style of the writing, the expression of the characters/dancers and the beauty of the 
artwork/performance piece. We would be encouraging an aesthetic experience based on 
those formal features (form, expression, unity, composition, line, colour, shape, tone, 
texture and pattern) but may discourage a moral or political reading of a work. 
Aestheticism involves expressly teaching students that the moral or political meaning or 
value of the work does not affect or impact upon its overall aesthetic value. This is fine 
when the artwork in question contains no ethical or political message, of which there 
may be some. Nussbaum (1998: 358) contends,
One can think of works of art which can be contemplated reasonably well without asking any 
urgent questions about how one should live. Abstract formalist paintings are sometimes of this 
character, and some intricate but non-programmatic works of music (though by no means all). 
But it seems highly unlikely that a responsive reading of any complex literary work is utterly 
detached from concerns about time and death, about pain and the transcendence of pain, and so 
on – all the material of ‘how one should live’ questions as I have conceived it.
Yet, this is not the case when it comes to all artworks and certainly is not the case in 
relation to narrative artworks.
With narrative artworks, such as works of literature, plays and films, there is always 
going to be some social, political and ethical messages in the work that are going to be 
important to understand if one is to understand the work in question. For example, one 
may watch Charles Chaplin’s (1936) Modern Times for its humour and enjoy it at face 
value. However, its philosophical reflection on the industrial revolution further augments 
its artistic and aesthetic value. This film marks the last appearance of Chaplin’s character, 
the Little Tramp, who is immediately recognisable and a powerful aspect to Chaplin’s 
mise en scène. But there is more to engage with than brilliant slapstick. As a silent film, 
the message about how machines should be used to benefit human beings and their work, 
as opposed to making workers cogs in the machine, reveals both hope and anxiety about 
the industrial revolution. Such themes, along with its commentary on class, power and 
societal progress are central to a fully fleshed out understanding of the film, which, in 
turn, enhance the aesthetic experience gleaned. Watching scenes from this old film with 
144 Theory and Research in Education 18(2)
students in a classroom today could be used to provoke a stimulating discussion about 
the centrality of technology in our lives today, and reflections as to whether Chaplin was 
right to worry about machines ‘taking over’ our lives.
Furthermore, as educators, we want such messages to be engaged with not just in an 
open and receptive manner, but an ethically critically engaged manner as well. According 
to Iris Murdoch, judgements about value(s) are unavoidable in narrative works as, ‘one 
cannot avoid value judgements. Values show, and show clearly, in literature’ (quoted in 
Magee, 1978: 278). Value judgements are imbedded in our language and the words we 
use often imply or presume certain kinds of moral evaluations. Murdoch (1998: 27–28) 
notes that
It is important to remember that language itself is a moral medium, almost all uses of language 
convey value. This is one reason why we are almost always morally active. Life is soaked in the 
moral, literature is soaked in the moral . . . So the novelist is revealing his values by any sort of 
writing which he may do. He is particularly bound to make moral judgements in so far as his 
subject-matter is the behaviour of human beings.
And so, to the extent that artworks contain moral and political messages, teaching our 
students to critically and compassionately engage with these stories, characters and the 
situations in which they find themselves is not only a part of understanding and appreci-
ating the work in question, but important pedagogically as well.
Murdoch and Nussbaum refer to the positive effects of engaging with good (aestheti-
cally and ethically) literature, and they are optimistic about the role for literature and 
narrative artworks in educational spaces. As Nussbaum (2010) remarks, the arts and the 
humanities work to activate and expand our capacity ‘to see the world through another 
person’s eyes’ (p. 96). Yet, there are also examples in which educators should teach stu-
dents to engage critically with the ethical messages contained in artworks because they 
may not be so positive or virtuous. And this is even more important when the aesthetic 
quality of the work is very good, beautiful or engaging.
Returning to the example of Triumph of the Will, which is often cited as being aes-
thetically good despite its immoral message; if the viewer, especially the young viewer, 
is not critically engaged with the moral and political messages of the film, then they are 
simply swept up in the beauty, magnificence, power and exuberance of Hitler and Nazi 
Germany. This would be worrying to educators precisely because of the (im)moral mes-
sages conveyed through Nazism. However, if our viewer is critically engaged with the 
ethical features of the film, they may find it difficult to purely enjoy the film and have a 
full aesthetic experience as a result, precisely due to the (im)moral element of the work. 
The latter can be explained perfectly on the position of moderate moralism or ethicism 
because we can see that the prescribed audience response: to love and celebrate Hitler 
and Nazi Germany, is ethically unwarranted, and, in the case of this propaganda docu-
mentary, therefore, also an aesthetic or formal flaw. The ethical failing of the work inter-
rupts and interferes with one’s aesthetic uptake of the work precisely because it is 
unavoidable in the meaning. The appropriately sensitive audience member cannot, in this 
case, divorce the ethical judgement from the work and, I claim, neither would we want 
them to or think that they should. Engaging with the work means engaging with all of 
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these elements and, as educators, we should teach students this. Devereaux (1998: 354) 
notes that if we bracket the political message of certain works of art, such as Orwell’s 
1984, and solely appreciate the formal features of the work, or admire Triumph of the 
Will purely for its beauty, then we miss an essential element of the work. This claim and 
examples such as these challenge the position known as aestheticism which insists on 
keeping the realms of aesthetics and ethics separate in relation to works of art.
Aesthetic and moral education
History reminds us that certain texts and artworks were deemed virtuous and praised, 
commissioned and displayed while others were censored and destroyed by the authori-
ties in positions of power who sought to convey and perpetuate certain ideas and values. 
This kind of censorship is something to which the aesthete strongly objects and, as edu-
cators, this should also be something we consider, when selecting artworks for inclusion 
on the arts curriculum. The question of which artworks and which or whose morals are 
allowed to be influential is inescapable here, and this inevitably highlights the concern to 
do with whose voices are neglected or omitted.
For example, Mark Twain’s (1885) Adventures of Huckleberry Finn has long been 
deemed to be a great work because of its aesthetic and ethical content. This is due to the 
skill of the writer who sketches a nuanced depiction of the friendship between Huck (a 
white teen) and Jim (a runaway adult male slave), set in Missouri, the United States, in 
the 1800s when slavery is legal. By offering an insight into the perspective of others who 
we might not otherwise encounter, readers have the chance to experience the tension 
between social mores, universal moral rules, the law and compassion. More importantly, 
they gain an insight into slavery even if they were born long after slavery was made 
illegal.
However, there are other ethical considerations educators also need to consider. 
Twain’s classic novel is not without controversy, most notably with its use of the ver-
nacular and racial stereotypes. Educators must consider which texts are included on a 
curriculum, and the reasons (historical, artistic and educative) for those choices. It is 
particularly important for educators to ensure texts featuring voices other than those of 
the (often male) White colonial are provided to students. These days, there are many 
excellent, authentic novels by Black and Indigenous authors (such as Toni Morrison (the 
United States), Sally Morgan (Australia) and others) that may be taught instead. Also, if 
you have a class that loves rap and hip hop music, and there is a debate to be had about 
the language used and stereotypes portrayed in such popular music, it would be fascinat-
ing to bring the conversation about such topics into the classroom (see Chetty and Turner, 
2018). Contemporary artworks such as these could be compared and contrasted with the 
classical text by Twain which is still commonly taught in American schools.
Just because we can make moral judgements of artworks, does not mean we should 
censor or restrict their creation and reception. However, it is understandable why the 
aesthete may be worried about the consequences of the moral judgements passed on 
artworks. Given that the ethicist claims that a work of art can be judged morally, and this 
impacts upon the overall value of an artwork, they may then go on (quite easily) to argue 
that bad moral artworks can have a negative impact upon its viewers and perhaps even 
146 Theory and Research in Education 18(2)
society as a whole. And perhaps this is of real concern to the ethicist – that the moral 
messages in artworks will influence the viewers and audiences of these works; it may 
harm members of our society and the community or simply change existing social norms. 
And this is precisely why aestheticists wish to protect artists and their artworks; because 
art is powerful. Yet, for educators, this is also why we should educate students to engage 
respectfully, critically and sympathetically with artworks. We need not deny that art can 
be influential, may present various perspectives and offer new ways of thinking about 
things. But from this, it need not follow that such free, creative expression be suppressed, 
repressed, censored or banned, even if there will always be exceptional cases and contex-
tual factors to consider. What does follow, educationally, is the need to teach students to 
be critically engaged viewers who are still able to appreciate and value art for its aes-
thetic experience.
Take the example of Richard Wagner’s Ring Cycle. The appropriately sensitive audi-
ence member may find it difficult to fully enjoy the aesthetic experience of the music 
when they understand the antisemitic sentiments expressed by the composer and the 
appropriation of Wagner’s music by Hitler and the Third Reich. Such discomfiture is not 
simply a matter of context – that is, where the performances are played or who may be in 
the audience (for instance, debates continue over the unofficial ban on live performances 
of Wagner’s music in Israel). There are also complex questions that surround the work, 
such as, how responsible is Wagner for further inspiring Hitler’s antisemitic ideology? 
Whatever the answers are to difficult ethical questions such as these, it makes listening 
to, and appreciating Wagner a multifaceted task. The educational point is that this art-
work presents a wonderful opportunity for dialogue. It may not be the educator’s task to 
provide answers to the students with respect to how they interpret or enjoy (or not) the 
work, but, rather, to encourage them to take up a position of critically engaged spectator-
ship. People will respond to artworks in various ways based on their individual identities, 
their past experiences and their subjective taste. And that is as it should be. But there 
should be a safe space created within the classroom to discuss the interesting questions 
that emerge – either prior to, during or after the experience of aesthetic engagement. And 
there should also be room for objection to the artwork, while understanding its position 
within the canon. So, it may be that a Jewish school decides not to play or perform the 
work, which makes sense. But that is not the same thing as ignoring its existence and 
refusing to discuss this interesting, seminal, artistically valuable and ethically challeng-
ing work.
The works of Donald Friend, however, provide us with a different case. The paintings 
and drawings of naked young Balinese boys by Australian artist and well-known paedo-
phile Donald Friend (whose diaries were published after his death in 1989) were well 
regarded by much of the artworld. Yet, once one knows about Friend’s perversion, it 
interrupts the viewer’s ability to appreciate the work precisely because the immorality of 
the artist’s behaviour enters into the experience of the art object itself as its content is 
tainted by an understanding of how the work was created. These underage boys served 
as not-entirely willing or not-entirely able to provide their consent models for the work; 
they were poor, working in the houses in which Friend used to stay when he visited 
Indonesia, and we now also have access to some of their accounts. In this case, I would 
not want educators to use such works in art classes. There are other suitable nudes or 
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Australian artists’ work to draw upon instead, such as the photographs of Bill Henson 
which depict pre-pubescent children in a natural state without similar allegations of 
impropriety. Thus, any interesting ethical questions that may arise surrounding the con-
tent may be meaningfully discussed without continuing to support the misuse of these 
images of these Balinese boys. Or, if such discussion is not relevant to the educational 
purpose, then artistic technique may be discussed using an artwork that does not involve 
connotations of pre-pubescent sexuality or paedophilia. These are discussions and 
debates that need to be held. Such examples are likely to be controversial and there will 
be disagreement. This is obvious, as evident in an example that has been discussed much 
more widely; Vladimir Nabokov’s (1955) Lolita, in which arguably sympathy is invited 
for the narrator Humbert.
To recap, then, the aesthete holds that while a moral value may be given to an artwork, 
this has nothing to do with that work’s aesthetic and, therefore, overall value. On this 
view, an art object may be morally ‘bad’ yet aesthetically ‘good’ and therefore its overall 
value as an artwork can be deemed good. This overall value must therefore be seen to be 
disconnected from how an artwork is used or how its impact upon society is judged. For 
instance, if the artwork is used in an ethically deplorable manner and this use has a nega-
tive impact upon society, this is, on the aesthete’s argument, a case of a good artwork 
being used in a bad way. Using the example of Triumph of the Will, the aesthete can 
maintain that the work of art is beautiful (if they do think it beautiful), aesthetically 
pleasing and the overall artistic value of the work is high, despite its negative moral mes-
sage. The aesthete may claim that the use of this film is morally and ethically wrong; it 
was used as a piece of Nazi propaganda, which is clearly immoral. Yet, the aesthete 
argues that the work in and of itself is fine, despite its moral component and its use being 
morally deplorable. The question that ethicists ask the aesthete is how can the intrinsic 
moral meaning of the work be denied formal attribution to the piece? Further difficult 
questions follow. Is the artist responsible for this artwork that was intentionally made 
with a flawed moral message? This question is particularly interesting when one consid-
ers that a work may be used in a way other than that intended by its author. And appropri-
ate display and exhibition is another important consideration that has also been the 
subject of debate with respect to works by Riefenstahl, Wagner, Donald Friend and 
others.3
The complex, difficult and nuanced nature of such debates to do with aesthetics and 
ethics, potential limits to free, creative expression and appropriate audiences/display of 
contentious artworks are those that benefit from educational facilitation. Carroll (2000) 
notes that ‘Artworks can be immensely subtle in terms of their moral commitments. 
Morally defective portrayals may elude even morally sensitive audiences and may 
require careful interpretation in order to be unearthed’ (p. 378). Thus, encouraging stu-
dents to think about and explore such ideas in arts education is an important part of teach-
ing young people to become appropriately sensitive audience members. Such audience 
members are sympathetic to artworks, open to receiving the aesthetic experience avail-
able to them by engaging with the artwork in question, yet they are also ethically criti-
cally active, particularly because art affects our emotions as well as our cognition. Where 
and when artworks contain moral, social and political messages, appropriately sensitive 
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audience members will engage with those too. In this way, ethicism is the most appropri-
ate position for arts educators to adopt.
Conclusion
In this article, I have detailed the position known as aestheticism (autonomism and mod-
erate autonomism) and compared this to the position defended by the ethicist (moderate 
moralism and ethicism). The aesthete claims that even if there is a moral value of an 
artwork, this will not (or should not) affect the work of art’s overall value as the overall 
value of a work of art should be based solely upon its aesthetic value. However, the ethi-
cist, adopting an all-things-considered perspective, argues that the moral value of art-
works can be gleaned, judged and may affect the overall value of a work of art. I have 
defended the ethicist, offering examples of when ethical failings in a work may also be 
aesthetic flaws which can interfere with the prescribed audience response and any aes-
thetic experience the viewer may potentially have by engaging with the work in question. 
But, most importantly, I have viewed this debate in aesthetics through an educational 
lens and added further support to my position by considering educational implications of 
aestheticism and ethicism.
It is vitally important that students are taught to value the aesthetic and formal fea-
tures of artworks and appreciate aesthetic experience. I see it as central to arts education 
that students are also taught to value the creative expression of artists and their works, 
even as these often push social boundaries and offer new and sometimes challenging 
perspectives. However, while this open, receptive and creative approach to art is at the 
heart of arts education, this does not necessitate switching off one’s critical engagement, 
which includes critically engaging with the ethical and political messages gleaned from 
art as well as the work’s aesthetic features. Where we find artworks containing moral 
and/or political messages, the viewer of the work ought to critically engage with these. 
This is the case to ensure they understand and appreciate the work (which may include 
considering contextual elements in relation to when the work was made) and also so they 
are not at risk of being uncritical in relation to the messages conveyed through art media. 
While the teacher may bypass any moral risk by carefully selecting which artworks the 
students engage with, this in itself does not then protect students when they are out on 
their own, encountering, engaging with and stumbling upon other artworks, including 
mass artworks and media. Thus, the skills of learning to appreciate and engage, both 
critically and in a receptive or sympathetic manner with artworks, is of fundamental use 
to our students throughout their lives.
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Notes
1. Noël Carroll (2000) outlines the different aesthetic positions that may be held with regard 
to art, including his own ‘moderate moralism’ in ‘Art and Ethical Criticism: an overview of 
recent directions of research’. See also ‘Ethical Criticism of Art’ in the Internet Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy available at: https://www.iep.utm.edu/art-eth/#SH5a
2. I am using the words ‘moral’ and ‘ethical’ interchangeably and thus am using the word ‘moral’ 
in a wide, not narrow, sense.
3. See debates within the public domain such as Funnell (2016) ‘Can bad people create good art’ 
and Funnell (2017) ‘Our favourite paedophile: Why is Donald Friend still celebrated?’
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